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The justiciable place of socio-economic rights in the South African
Constitution is being undermined by non-compliance with court orders issued
in court processes involving the enforcement of these rights. This has, in
some cases, left successful litigants stranded and unable to benefit from the
orders arising from their victories. One of the provinces where this problem
has risen to unprecedented levels is the Eastern Cape, as is clear from the
many social grant judgments which have not been implemented as directed
by the courts. Generally speaking, non-implementation can be blamed on
the approach adopted by the courts as seen, for instance, in the Constitutional
Court’s reluctance to use the structural interdict.
While not overlooking the deficiencies in the courts’ approach, however,
a more critical evaluation reveals many problems apart from this approach.
Foremost among these is the reluctance of state officials to observe the rule
of law and respect court orders. The outbursts of Amos Masondo, the mayor
of Johannesburg, whenever the city loses a critical court challenge, epitomise
the magnitude of this problem. After a recent case decision outlawing the
use of prepaid water meters, the mayor stated that judges are not above the
law and should not take over the roles of Parliament and the National
Council of Provinces.
Another contributing factor is the lack of transparency and consultation
in the implementation of court orders. Successful petitioners and other
stakeholders involved in the court process are usually not informed about
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the steps that the state is taking to implement the court orders. This makes
both meaningful participation and the monitoring of progress extremely
difficult. It has contributed to delays in the execution of court orders since it
excludes a number of role-players who could contribute positively to the
process of implementation.
Similarly, there is an absence of inter-governmental cooperation and
coordination when implementing orders which involve the participation of
more than one sphere of government. Most socio-economic rights, for example,
fall into this category.
The analysis also reveals that, in some instances, non-implementation,
as is the case in the Eastern Cape, has arisen from maladministration
combined with a lack of capacity to carry out the required reforms, rather
than from obstinacy. The housing sector has also been prone to this problem.
Incapacity, especially at the provincial and local government levels, has
made timely delivery of quality housing difficult. Sometimes, the obstinacy
is a product of the failure to appreciate the nature of the constitutional
obligations imposed on the state.
Nevertheless, there is room for optimism. The progress made in the
implementation of the interlocutory order in the recent case of Occupiers of
51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others is evidence
that the state can fulfil its obligations. This case has illustrated the power
of negotiated settlements if done at the behest and under the close supervision
of the court.
To confront the challenge of non-implementation, this paper proposes
various strategies, including:
1. Taking advantage of the Nyathi v MEC Department of Health Gauteng
judgment invalidating s 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957. This has
widened the possibilities for securing compliance by the state with court
orders.
2. Inculcating and entrenching a culture of constitutionalism and respect
for the rule of law, as state officials must learn that judicial processes
are not adverse to other organs of state but play a complementary role.
3. Cultivating inter-institutional trust between the courts, the government
and civil society, which can be achieved by promoting alternative dispute
resolution and amicable settlement, not only as alternatives to court
action, but also as part of the court processes.
4. Using a combination of strategies and heightening the use of social
mobilisation after successful litigation to call for the implementation of
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court orders. Social mobilisation has the potential to promote the
implementation of court orders in the same way that it has promoted
substantive litigation on socio-economic rights.
5. Heightening monitoring by civil society and other actors of the
implementation of court orders. Monitoring and supervision, if done in a
coordinated and amicable manner, can help to overcome some of the
administrative hurdles likely to be encountered in the implementation
of the orders.
6. Promoting consultation and intergovernmental cooperation between the
different spheres of government in the implementation of orders. This
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1 INTRODUCTION
The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the South African Bill of Rights
signifies that the redress of poverty and disadvantage is a matter of
constitutional concern.1 For those who toiled under apartheid, were deprived
socio-economically, and sacrificed their lives to fight authoritarianism, the
new Constitution was perceived as a beacon of hope. While they might not
have expected to drive expensive cars and live in up-market suburbs, they
expected, at the very least, to move out of their shacks, have greater access
to sufficient food and water, and access to health care services. To these
people, enforcement of socio-economic rights through the courts is of utmost
importance. Indeed, the courts have taken note of the long years of deprivation
and the constitutional commitment to reverse this situation.2 In this regard,
the justiciability of the socio-economic rights protected in the Constitution
and their transformative potential has been given a judicial nod. The
Constitutional Court (Court) has held that the judicial enforcement of these
rights does not raise any more complex problems than the judicial
enforcement of civil and political rights.3 According to the Court, socio-
economic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights and the question
is not whether they are justiciable, but how to enforce them in a given
case.4
Despite this, although more than 12 years have elapsed since the adoption
of the final Constitution, the majority of the population in the country
remains entrapped in poverty. A significant number of South Africans still
live in appalling conditions on the peripheries of the country’s modern
2
Christopher Mbazira
economy.5 Poverty has been exacerbated by a skewed distribution of wealth,
lack of access to basic services for the poor, unemployment and the socio-
economic effect of HIV/AIDS.6 These conditions raise a pertinent question:
given the entrenchment of socio-economic rights in the Constitution and
their recognition as capable of judicial enforcement, why has poverty
persisted? Jagwanth argues that constitutional litigation leads to the
conclusion that it is the more privileged groups in society and not the
vulnerable that are seeking the protection of the Bill of Rights.7
However, a number of decisions on socio-economic rights have in fact
been made by the courts. The question is whether these decisions have
made any difference to the lives of the poor. Have these judgments had the
desired effect? How have those in authority reacted to the judgments and
the orders made by the courts? Have the orders been obeyed and
implemented? How have the courts and other role-players responded to the
problem of non-compliance with court orders? This paper seeks to find
answers to these questions. In addition, it aims to address the issue of the
extent to which litigation, per se, can be used to achieve socio-economic
transformation.
The failure of socio-economic rights court decisions to lead to rapid socio-
economic transformation can be attributed in some measure to the failure
of the state to comply with court orders arising from these decisions.8 When
broadly assessed, the government’s record in implementing court orders,
especially those concerning socio-economic rights, has not been satisfactory.9
As will be seen with respect to housing, for instance, there are generally
many progressive court judgments. However, the effect of these judgments
is limited.10
The failure to implement court orders effectively could, therefore, be
described as the “weakest link” in realising socio-economic rights. Successful
litigants have remained hopeless and the judiciary helpless in the face of
non-compliance with court orders, which has undermined the legitimacy of
the courts. As was observed by the Court in Nyathi v MEC Department of
Health Gauteng (Nyathi case),11 deliberate non-compliance with court orders
by the state detracts from the dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the
courts.12 The magnitude of this problem has forced the courts to conclude
that some state officials have become a law unto themselves, and openly
violate people’s rights while believing that they cannot be held responsible
for their actions.13
This state of affairs has cast doubt on the potential of litigation to ensure
rapid socio-economic transformation. Until something is done to improve
the situation, the independence and legitimacy of the judiciary remain under
3
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enormous threat. This paper, in addition to answering the questions raised
above, makes some recommendations on how to improve the situation. I
submit, however, that one cannot tackle the problem of non-compliance
with court orders without understanding the philosophical and practical
underpinnings that define the nature of the orders (judicial remedies) that
emanate from the courts and the manner of their implementation. One also
needs to appreciate the transformative potential of judicial enforcement of
human rights standards and the role of the courts in championing social
justice. This paper begins with this issue, following it with a discussion of
the theoretical and practical underpinnings of judicial remedies.
The paper also sketches the courts’ approach to interpreting the substance
of socio-economic rights. Furthermore, it reviews a number of socio-economic
rights judgments and discusses the extent to which the orders granted in
those cases have been complied with. The last section of the paper makes
suggestions on the best strategies for implementing court orders in socio-
economic rights cases; in other words, saying goodbye to the “weakest link”
in socio-economic rights litigation.
1.1 What is a remedy?
The term “remedy” means several things, not only in generic but also legal
terms. In legal terms, a remedy is a process of legal redress embracing all
the legal procedures that a person has to follow to redress the violation of
their rights. The term is also used to mean the substantive rights which
exist before legal proceedings begin.14 In addition, the term refers to all
means by which the violation of rights are vindicated, including non-judicial
means exercised at the discretion of the executive and legislative organs of
state.
The definition which has been adopted for purposes of this paper is,
however, a narrower one: a remedy is the order made by a court in response
to a proven violation of a person’s rights. It constitutes what a court orders
as the final equivalent given to a person in place of his original primary
rights which have been broken.15 To determine whether a remedy is
appropriate requires one to appreciate the obligations created by the court
order and then to determine whether these obligations have been discharged.
There are four types of obligations arising from court orders: (i) cessation;
(ii) non-repetition; (iii) reparation; and (iv) just satisfaction.16 The obligation
of cessation requires the person to whom the order is directed to put an end
to the breach or condemned conduct. This is a negative duty requiring one
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to desist from continuing with certain conduct. The obligation of non-
repetition is a deterrent: it prevents further violation in future. This could
be against not only a specific litigant but also similarly situated people
(foreseen and unforeseen). Reparation is compensatory; it requires the person
to whom the order is directed to repair the damage caused to the applicant.
Although this obligation has been defined mainly in relation to the need to
restore the status quo of an individual litigant before the breach,17 it also
includes restoration of the rights of groups of people. This remedy is
particularly relevant to socio-economic rights because they mainly require
the state to undertake affirmative action to provide for people’s socio-economic
needs. The final obligation, just satisfaction, entitles the victim to an award
of compensation from the perpetrator as relief.
1.2 Remedies under the South African Constitution
In South Africa, the power of the courts to award remedies for violations of
the rights protected in the Constitution derives from ss 38 and 172 of the
Constitution. Section 38 empowers the courts to “grant appropriate relief,
including a declaration of rights”. Section 172(1) provides:
When deciding a constitutional matter within its powers, a court –
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistence; and
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including –
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of
invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any pe-
riod and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to
correct the defect.
In Fose v Minister of Safety (Fose case),18 the Court held:
Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect
and enforce the Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each
particular case the relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a
mandamus or such other relief as may be required to ensure that the
rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is
necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to
secure the protection and enforcement of these all important rights.19
In the Fose case, the Court also held that as a court it had a duty to ensure
that “within the bounds of the Constitution, effective relief be granted for
the infringement of any of the rights enshrined in it”.20 Accordingly, “an
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appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights entrenched in
the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced”.21 The Court held
further that, in order to provide an effective remedy to vindicate constitutional
rights, it could “‘forge new tools and shape innovative remedies”.22
The South African experience illustrates that the enforcement of
constitutional rights faces two formidable challenges. The first challenge,
as seen in such early cases as Fose, is devising appropriate, just and equitable
remedies in response to violations of constitutional rights. The second is
devising “appropriate remedies” in response to the failure to comply with
court-ordered remedies. This paper deals with the second challenge. Indeed,
as already mentioned, the failure to enforce court orders in socio-economic
rights litigation effectively has cast doubt on the effectiveness of litigation
as a tool of socio-economic transformation. In my opinion, however, the
transformative potential of litigation, despite some of its constraints, should
not be doubted. I elucidate this point in the next section.
2 LITIGATION AS A TOOL OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
Using the court to enforce rights has a number of limitations and might fail
to drive socio-economic transformation as rapidly as would be expected.
Court action, in addition to being reactive, is often a bilateral contest between
two parties.23 The success of court action is conditional upon cases being
instituted and the effective implementation of the resultant court orders.
Despite this, in my opinion, court action plays a very important role in
delivering social justice and realising an egalitarian society. Indeed, the
history of struggle in South Africa shows that “courts can be an important
forum for ventilating popular concerns, for dramatising them and bringing
them to public attention, and in some cases for finding a satisfactory
resolution”.24 However, for court action to be effective, it must be supported
and complemented by other strategies such as advocacy and social
mobilisation.25 It is clear therefore that, without other strategies, court orders
might not bring about fundamental change in society as quickly as might
be desired.26
Nevertheless, the importance of court action per se should not be
underestimated. Where the political system has failed to respond to demands
for socio-economic transformation, court action might achieve significant
results.27 Court action can precipitate policy formulation and/or
reformulation, lead to political mobilisation, achieve enforcement of legal
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standards, and complement and support electoral politics.28 This is because,
like the electoral processes, court action might force the government to
account for its actions.29
To be successful, litigation itself must overcome some obstacles and follow
certain processes. According to Gloppen:
The success or failure of litigation depends on (a) the ability of groups
whose rights are violated to articulate their claims and voice them into
the legal system – or have the rights claimed on their behalf; (b) re-
sponsiveness of the courts at various levels towards the social claims
that are voiced; (c) the capability of the judges – that is, their ability to
find adequate means to give legal effect to social rights; (d) whether the
social rights judgments that are handed down have authority in the
sense that they are accepted, complied with and implemented through
legislation and policy.30
It would be useful to discuss briefly each of the components described above
and to assess their application in South Africa. First, successful victim
voicing is dependent on resources or the capacity of victims to articulate
their concerns.31 This capacity is determined by organisational resources;
access to legal aid/advice; availability and quality of pro bono litigation;
awareness through legal literacy programmes; overcoming practical barriers
of access to courts such as costs, distance, language and lack of information;
the nature of the legal system in terms of structure, formalism, bureaucracy,
rules of standing, courts’ jurisdiction and formal position of social rights;
and overcoming motivational barriers such as distrust, social fear, past
experience and perceptions.32
Second, Gloppen describes the factors that influence the responsiveness
of the courts.33 The first factor is the legal culture, which includes the judges’
perceptions of their role in politics. The second factor is the extent to which
courts have been sensitised about social rights issues, which could be through
training and curriculum development. A third factor is the nature of the
legal system; this raises the same questions about the structure of the
courts, their jurisdiction and standing as the ones applicable to the voices of
the victims. Lastly, Gloppen refers to the composition of the bench in terms
of the social background of the judges and other social attributes such as
gender and ethnicity.
The third component – capability – is very relevant to the discussions in
this paper. It is this factor that determines the nature of the remedies that
the courts hand down. Equally relevant is the fourth component –
compliance. According to Gloppen, the willingness of judges to respond to
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social rights claims is not enough; the judges must also be able to find
adequate legal remedies to repair the violation. This requires professional
competence and creativity, access to relevant knowledge and command of
the necessary legal remedies.34 The factors that condition capability include:
sensitisation to social rights issues; access to relevant legal materials; capacity
and infrastructure as determined by resources available to the courts,
independence from government influence and dominant forces; and the
nature of the legal system and the composition of the bench.35
Compliance with social rights judgments, according to Gloppen, is
conditioned by the political culture; the balance of power between dominant
social forces; political will as shown by ideological commitments and
prioritisation; the extent of social mobilisation; implementation capacity in
terms of economic and administrative capacity, and as defined by the level
of state formation; independence of the judges; and the court’s legitimacy in
terms of public support.36
The status in South Africa of each of Gloppen’s four criteria has been
discussed briefly above. In this section, the paper deals in more detail with
the first component (victims’ voices) and the others are looked at in the
following sections. Access to justice for the poor in South Africa, like many
African countries, is limited by many problems. These include: the “[c]ost of
lawyers and court fees, transport, income loss; language barriers, and lack
of information and knowledge”.37 Although the South African legal system
is regarded as being fairly favourable to social rights litigation, it is noted
that the system has remained quite bureaucratic and formalistic.38 In
addition, the usual difficulties of accessing justice are exacerbated by gross
socio-economic inequalities and the remoteness of the law from peoples’ lives:
“[i]n the absence of legal aid for constitutional matters, poor people are
largely unable to take cases through the normal judicial system, which is
both lengthy and costly.”39
Although poor people can access legal aid through the Legal Aid Board,
such access has not been without problems. Besides its limited capacity,
there are concerns regarding the quality of the services provided by the
Board.40 This gap has to a certain extent been closed by the flexible rules on
standing before the courts and the Court’s endorsement of the concept of
amicus curiae. The Rules of the Court have been used to allow privately
funded institutions – such as the Community Law Centre (University of
the Western Cape), Centre for Human Rights (University of Pretoria), Legal
Resources Centre, Treatment Action Campaign and the Centre for Applied
Legal Studies (CALS) (University of the Witwatersrand) – to intervene in
social rights litigation and provide legal services to those in need. Indeed,
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these interest groups have instituted or participated in almost all the key
socio-economic rights cases decided by the courts in South Africa so far. The
role of these groups has been to ensure that human rights discourse does
not remain the domain of the privileged few in society.41 The organisations
have brought new perspectives to the interpretation of socio-economic rights,
and have organised and assisted poor litigants and provided them with the
resources to access courts. This is in addition to actively overseeing the
implementation of court orders. In these respects, the organisations have
played an important role in developing the content of socio-economic rights
and the obligations they give rise to.
3 A SKETCH OF THE COURTS’ CONCEPTUALISATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
3.1 Relevance of rights/obligations analysis
This section discusses the second component of Gloppen’s anatomy –
responsiveness of the courts to social rights. It draws on Gloppen’s scheme
to make the point that one cannot determine the most appropriate remedy
to vindicate a right without understanding the nature of the right and the
obligations it gives rise to. It should be noted that there could be rights
which do not necessarily attract judicial remedies and which could be enforced
through means other than judicial enforcement. The relevance of such rights
should not be undermined. Nevertheless, the importance of court orders in
enforcing human rights needs to be emphasised.42
Rights and remedies are inextricably linked, and determination of neither
right nor remedy can be made in isolation from one another.43 It is evident
in ordinary procedural terms that the process of finding the most appropriate
remedy begins only after establishing that a right has been infringed.44 In
this regard, rights and remedies could be defined as having primary and
secondary aspects respectively. The primary aspect addresses the obligations
to which the rights give rise and the secondary aspect address the question
of what ought to be done once these obligations have not been discharged.45
To a certain extent, therefore, there is a permeable wall between rights
and remedies. When crafting remedies, courts must consider the nature of
the right and the obligations it creates to ensure that the right and obligations
are respected and protected in full.46 This is only possible if the substantive
nature of the rights and the obligations it gives rise to are understood.
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3.2 Approach in substantive rights terms
In South Africa socio-economic rights can be judicially enforced. Despite
this, questions often arise regarding the suitability of the courts as avenues
of enforcing these rights. Thus, concerns about separation of powers as
regards the enforcement of socio-economic rights continue to detract
significantly from the progress made in enforcing the rights. It has been
fairly easy to justify the status of socio-economic rights as pure rights and
to dispel assertions that these rights are essentially positive, have budgetary
implications and touch on the redistribution of resources.47 Responses to
these objections have been simple and very practical: civil and political
rights are no different – they also engender positive obligations and have
budgetary implications.48 Additionally, socio-economic rights give rise to
negative obligations.49
The judicial competence-based objections, as often glossed by concerns
about separation of powers, have also focused on the supposed special features
of socio-economic rights. Despite this, competence objections are based mainly
on the perceived institutional inappropriateness of the judiciary to adjudicate
these rights. The judiciary, staffed by unaccountable elites detached from
the daily experience of poverty, is believed to lack the skills required for
making decisions that have budgetary and redistributive effects. Decisions
touching on these rights are also believed to be polycentric – they have
multiple repercussions, some of which the judiciary might not easily discern
and respond to when the decision is made.50 Moreover, setting aside decisions
of democratically elected representatives of the people by unaccountable
judges is counter-democratic.51 If judges become “heavily involved in
essentially political decisions, yet ... not accountable as political bodies are
normally, a sense of irresponsibility can emerge”.52
The Court has shrugged off the separation of powers- and institutional-
based objections and asserted its powers to adjudicate socio-economic rights,
holding that its primary duty is to the Constitution. According to the Court,
where state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, the
Court has powers to determine whether the policy gives effect to the
Constitution and to declare that it is unconstitutional: “[i]n so far as [this]
constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion
mandated by the Constitution itself”.53 Despite this, the Court has been
conscious of its delicate and weak position within the framework of separation
of powers. In the case of Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action
Campaign (TAC case),54 for instance, the Court cautioned that courts are
ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple
10
Christopher Mbazira
social and economic consequences for the community.55 Hence, the position
adopted by the Court is that, although the judiciary is duty-bound to prod
and prompt the executive and legislature continuously, it must be aware of
the need for self-imposed limits.56
Awareness of the need for self-imposed limits is manifested not only in
the Court’s approach in construing the content of the rights and the obligations
they engender, but also in defining what it considers appropriate, just and
equitable relief. In light of this, the judicial competence and the concerns
based on the separation of powers are an inevitable consideration in any
analysis of judicial remedies for socio-economic rights violations. In my
view, a court’s understanding of its institutional role might dictate the kind
of remedies that it is prepared to grant. Additionally, the lack of technical
expertise might prevent courts from awarding certain remedies and might
also shape the scope of the selected remedy.57 As will be seen, evidence in
South Africa reveals that the perceived role of the judiciary within the
framework of the separation of powers has been one of the factors that explain
why the government’s attitude towards court orders is sometimes negative.
From the perspective of the normative construction of the rights, the
Court’s rejection of the minimum core obligations concept and its resort to
the reasonableness inquiry could have been motivated by the separation of
powers and competence-based concerns. The Court has held that it has no
capacity to determine the minimum core. In the Grootboom case, after
considering the variables that have to be taken into account in defining the
minimum core, it concluded that “[a]ll this illustrates the complexity of the
task of determining a minimum core obligation for the progressive realisation
of the right[s]”.58 In the TAC case, the Court held that it should be borne in
mind that courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging
factual and political enquiries necessary for determining the minimum core.59
Initially, as can be seen in the Soobramoney case, the Court adopted a
highly deferential standard of review.60 It held a court would be slow to
interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs
and authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.61 The
approach of the Court was later refined into the reasonableness review, a
more substantive and less deferential approach.62 In the Grootboom case,
the Court held that a reasonable programme is one that is comprehensive
and well coordinated. The programme must clearly allocate responsibilities
and tasks to the different spheres of government and ensure that the
appropriate financial and human resources are available.63 Accordingly,
each sphere of government must accept responsibility for the implementation
of particular parts of a comprehensive and well-coordinated programme.64
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The programme must be balanced and flexible and must make appropriate
provision for attention to short-, medium- and long-term needs. “A programme
that excludes a significant segment of society cannot be said to be
reasonable.”65 Those whose needs are most urgent and whose ability to enjoy
all rights is most in peril must not be ignored by measures aimed at achieving
realisation of a particular right.66 The Court held further that the programme
must be reasonable both in conception and implementation, as formulation
of a programme is only the first stage in meeting the state’s obligations; it
must also be reasonably implemented.
It should be noted, however, that while the reasonableness approach is
more rigorous than the rationality test, it still incorporates an element of
judicial deference. It remains respectful of the democratic decision-making
process and the limited nature of public resources, while also requiring
special deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are not being
met.67 Despite this, there are cases in which the Court has pushed the
boundaries of the separation of powers. One example is Khosa and Others v
Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social
Development and Others.68 In this case, the applicants were permanent
residents and the Court found that their right to social assistance had been
violated. On the basis of this, the Court made substantial incursions into
the state’s rationalisation based on financial considerations. It used the
evidence before it, albeit scanty, to reject the contention that resource
constraints justified non-extension of the right to the applicants. According
to the Court, the inclusion of the applicants was likely to lead to a very
small proportional increment (2%) in the entire social grants budget.69 While
applying the principle of proportionality, the Court concluded that the rights
of the applicants were very important; such a minimal increment in the
budget could not justify their exclusion.
Despite such levels of incursion, South African judicial decisions still
stand out as respectful of democracy and its institutional settings. What
the courts have done is to remove obstructions to the functioning of democracy
but without usurping the political decision-making powers. The courts have
only done what has been described as “unblocking the channels of
democracy”.70 Despite this, the effect of the court judgments from the
perspective of judicial remedies has raised more questions than answers. It
is contended that the courts have not adopted those remedies that are
appropriate in countering state non-compliance.71 These questions will be
answered by considering the remedial approach of the courts and the factors
that have influenced the kinds of remedies awarded thus far.
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4 CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: FORMS, PHILOSOPHICAL
AND PRACTICAL UNDERPINNINGS
In defining the third component of his anatomy of the legal process, Gloppen
identifies factors that condition a court’s approach to remedies. These are
“professional competence and creativity, access to relevant knowledge and
command of the necessary legal remedies”.72
In my opinion, however, there are other factors that influence the courts
in granting remedies. These factors could be philosophical and ideological.
Courts also take into account practical considerations such as the obstacles
likely to be encountered when implementing the remedies. These include
the facts of the case and the circumstances on the ground; the level of
willingness to comply shown by the state; administrative hurdles likely to
be encountered in implementing the remedy; general acceptance of the
remedy by the parties and other stakeholders; and financial and logistical
considerations.
4.1 Philosophical considerations
One of the most important philosophical factors that influences courts in
choosing judicial remedies is the form of justice to which they are inclined.73
However, judges rarely expressly acknowledge that their remedies have
been influenced by a particular form of justice. This influence can only be
deduced from reading court judgments. One cannot do this, though, unless
the different forms of justice are identified and understood. In this section,
two competing forms of justice will be discussed: corrective justice and
distributive justice.
Corrective justice is associated with libertarianism, a philosophy based
on the notion of individual autonomy.74 The law exists only to protect this
autonomy and to restore it whenever there is an infraction. Justice from
this perspective is compensatory – the remedies here seek only to restore
the victim of a violation to the position he or she would have been in had the
violation not occurred.75 This means that any remedy that lacks the potential
to restore the victim’s position is inappropriate. Corrective justice is
backward-looking. Understanding past events is an integral part of the
adjudication process because it enables courts to determine the position of
the victim before the infringement. The court is also required to look
backwards for the purposes of establishing the defendant’s guilt as based on
facts.76
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Unlike corrective justice, distributive justice is concerned with the
distribution of benefits and burdens among members of a given group.77
This form of justice is about the fair apportionment of the burdens and
benefits of risky activities.78 Distributive justice is closely linked to
utilitarianism, which is a philosophy based on the principle that human
beings are a community with a collective agenda to maximise community
welfare. The objective here is to ensure that benefits produced by everyone’s
efforts are fairly distributed and shared.79 From this perspective, the
individual is not an end but exists together with others with whom he or
she pursues a common end.80
In terms of legal adjudication, this means that although a court might
be adjudicating a seemingly individual claim, it must consider the effect of
its decision on the collective wellbeing. The court must establish any conflict
of values that have to be reconciled. A court inclined towards distributive
justice might, therefore, decline to restore the victim to the position he or
she was in prior to the violation, if this would have a negative effect on the
legitimate interests of other members of society. Remedies arising from this
form of adjudication will not be restricted to remedies that restore the position
of the victim.81
South Africa’s commitment to the ethos of distributive justice is reflected
not only in the manner in which courts have interpreted the substantive
socio-economic rights but also in the remedies granted for their violation.82
As a response to widespread poverty and deprivation, the Constitution
protects socio-economic rights as extending entitlements that can largely
be claimed in a group. The Constitution itself is perceived as an instrument
to move the country towards a society of equal distribution of resources.83 It
should be noted, however, that due to resource and other constraints, such
equitable distribution cannot be achieved at once. This has dictated the
rejection of approaches that construe socio-economic rights as conferring
individual entitlements on demand.84
Consequently, courts have generally avoided orders that confirm individual
entitlements.85 The general approach of the court has been to define
“appropriate, just and equitable relief” from the perspective of distributive
justice. The Court has, for instance, held that when rights are violated,
though the victim might be an individual, society as a whole is injured.86 It
is for this reason that the courts have opted for remedies that spread the
benefits of constitutional litigation to all those affected or similarly situated:
“[t]he resources of the State have to be deployed ... in a manner which best
brings relief and hope to the widest sections of the community.”87
The problem, however, is that the Court has so far not explored the
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option of awarding damages to be “employed in structural and systemic
ways” that reduce the causes of infringements. It is on this basis the Court
has been urged to explore the possibility of awarding what has been described
as “preventive damages” to counter widespread and persistent violations.88
Preventive damages are awards that, instead of compensating the individual
victim, go to bodies carrying out activities designed to deter future
infringements of specific rights. They are usually accompanied by directions
that the damages be used to support activities directed at promoting the full
realisation of the right(s) forming the subject of contention. 89
4.2 Practical considerations: intransigence,
administrative and resource considerations
Courts should not operate in the abstract; rather, the context in which they
operate should not only influence their approach to giving meaning to the
substantive rights but should also guide them in choosing remedies for the
violation of these rights. Remedies that work where there is good faith
compliance with court orders will be inadequate in the face of intransigence.
Additionally, remedies that ignore the administrative and resource hurdles
of their implementation will remain paper tigers. Accordingly, what works
with a government that is simply inattentive to constitutional standards
might not work with a government that is incompetent.90 “[S]tronger
remedies, including ultimately the threat and use of contempt proceedings,
may be necessary to deal with government actors that are simply opposed
or intransigent to constitutional standards.”91 This could explain why a
court in some circumstances may opt for a declaration instead of a mandatory
or supervisory injunction and vice versa.
4.2.1 Declaratory orders
A declaratory order is a legal statement of the legal relationship between
the parties.92 It is primarily used to declare whether a particular decision or
conduct is legally valid.93 A declaratory order does not, however, give
directions as to how a violation should be remedied. It is left to the state to
determine how and when to remedy the violation.94 It might not be
prescriptive as regards the options that are available, but there is no bar to
such orders being crafted in a manner that clarifies all the legal
uncertainties. A declaratory order may contain broad normative guidelines
on the positive action required for remedying the breach.95 Where, for
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instance, the obligation to remedy the violation falls on more than one person,
it is important to specify the obligations of each person in clear and certain
terms. This might be the case where the matter involves several spheres of
government.96
Declaratory orders are particularly successful against states that are
committed to the rule of law and have demonstrated positive responsiveness
to the decisions of the courts.97 For example, states parties to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
have consistently complied with declaratory judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights. Likewise, the Canadian government has responded
positively to declaratory orders.98 This has made declaratory orders very
common remedies in these jurisdictions.
In South Africa, the declaratory order in the Grootboom case was handed
down on the basis of the belief that the government would abide by the
findings of the Court. It is clear from the judgment that the government’s
housing programme was found lacking. Ideally, any order of court should
have required the state to take measures to rectify the defects identified. It
could be contended that the decision of the Court to make a declaratory
order was based on the amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties
following the state’s offer of temporary shelter. Despite this, the Court could
still have made any order it considered “appropriate”, including a mandatory
order, even when the same had not been prayed for.99 In my opinion, however,
the Court did not take this course because it had every reason to believe
that the state would be guided by the declaratory order to make changes in
the Housing Programme.
This was the first major socio-economic rights case decided against the
state under the new Constitution. There was no evidence of previous non-
compliance with court orders in cases of this nature, so the Court had no
reason to believe that the state was unlikely to abide by the declaratory
order. It was, therefore, appropriate for the Court to rely on the good faith of
the state. Indeed, the evidence in the case indicated such good faith: the
state had settled the case between itself and the applicants and had, by way
of interlocutory judgment, undertaken to provide the applicants with some
basic housing services.100
4.2.2 Mandatory interdicts
A mandatory interdict is an order expressed in positive terms requiring the
person to whom it is directed to undertake positive steps to remedy a wrong
for which he/she is responsible.101 While this type of order is appropriate as
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a means of enforcing both the negative obligations engendered by socio-
economic rights, it is most suited for the enforcement of positive obligations
of these rights.102 Such orders might therefore “be given against government
officials in respect of violations of the positive duties ‘to protect and fulfil’
socio-economic rights”.103 The mandatory interdict is most appropriate in
cases where there is evidence of possible non-compliance with the court
order.
However, the South African experience shows that other than non-
compliance, the justification for making mandatory interdicts has arisen
from the nature of the violation and the urgency to remedy it. In some cases
though, evidence of possible non-compliance has been detected on the sidelines
of the case. While it is not expressly acknowledged in the sometimes
diplomatically written judgments, one cannot rule out the possibility that
such evidence could have influenced the making of the orders. For example,
in response to the High Court decision in the TAC case, the then-Minister of
Health, Tshabalala-Msimang said:
If this judgment is allowed to stand it creates a precedent that could be
used by a wide variety of interest groups wishing to exercise quite
specific influences on government policy in the area of socio-economic
rights. It could open the way for a spate of court applications and
‘policy judgments’ not only relating to health care but also to other
service areas, such as education, housing and social services. What
happens to public policy if it begins to be formulated piecemeal fash-
ion through unrelated court judgments?104
Later, the Minister proclaimed on public television that the government
was not prepared to abide by any order against it.105 This attitude was carried
on to the Court, where the state, relying on the doctrine of separation of
powers, submitted that all that the Court is empowered to do if it finds that
government policy is unconstitutional, is to issue a declaration.106
The Court was very firm on its powers to award effective remedies which
included both declaratory orders and mandatory interdicts. It stated:
Where a breach of any right has taken place, including a socio-economic
right, a court is under duty to ensure that effective relief is granted. The
nature of the right infringed and the nature of the infringement will
provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in a particular case.
Where necessary this may include both the issuing of a mandamus
and the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.107
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Although at the end of the case, evidence had emerged that the
government was prepared to abide by the judgment of the court, the Court
thought that the urgency of the matter merited a mandatory interdict. The
approach of the Court indicates that the commitment by the government
was too fluid to merit a declaratory order alone. The final order of the Court
required the government to remove, without delay, the restrictions that
prevented nevirapine from being made available at public hospitals and
clinics that had not been designated as research and training sites.
Subsequent events proved the usefulness of the mandatory order, as some
provinces had to be threatened with contempt of court order applications to
extract compliance with the order.108
The 2007 High Court decision regarding the rights of prisoners to access
antiretroviral drugs also presents clear evidence of government non-
compliance.109 While publicly proclaiming its willingness to abide by the
court orders,110 the government was delaying implementing the order in
this case. They did so even though the court had applied what could be
considered as the most powerful remedy in the form of the structural interdict.
This means that declaratory orders alone in this case would have gone
unnoticed. The government was keen to exploit procedural, yet untenable,
legal technicalities to delay the implementation of the orders of the court by
filing serial appeals. This, and events following the making of the court
order, signalled the government’s reluctance to abide by the orders of court.
4.2.3 Structural interdicts
The structural interdict (or supervisory interdict) is also a useful tool to
counter possible non-compliance. This form of remedy has proved effective
in countering inefficiency, especially where it has become systemic. The
structural interdict is a complicated form of interdict which challenges the
doctrine of functus officio.111 This form of remedy allows the court to supervise
the implementation of its order by, for instance, requiring the defendant to
report back to court on the measures taken to effect the directions of court.
The challenge of the functus officio doctrine comes when the court returns
to its order and modifies it. It can be argued, however, that courts retain
residual jurisdiction over cases in which judgment has already been rendered
with regard to the implementation of the judgment.112
Experiences in the United States show that in extreme cases the court
may implement its own order by, for instance, taking over the management
of the offending institution and effecting changes.113 This might be necessary
where the institution is chronically inefficient and cannot be reformed
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without external intervention. The structural interdict is considered to be
an extreme remedy, especially when viewed in terms of the doctrine of the
separation of powers.114 In the United States, this form of interdict has
resulted in dramatic increases in public expenditure by the affected public
institutions.115
The extreme nature of the structural interdict demands that it should
only be used as a remedy of last resort. 116 Courts should make a structural
interdict only when the other organs are seriously and chronically in
default.117 The courts should first ascertain whether there is a chance of
using executive or legislative discretion to redress the constitutional
violation.118 It is only when this initial attempt has failed that the court
should intervene by issuing a structural interdict.
In South Africa, the High Court has used the structural interdict more
readily than the Constitutional Court. In Centre for Child Law and Others
v MEC for Education and Others, the High Court’s use of this remedy
seems to have rested on the need to counter the state’s reticence in realising
socio-economic rights.119 In City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others
(Rudolph case),120 the High Court, in making the order, employed the
principles enunciated in the Grootboom case to hold that the government
had failed to ameliorate the conditions of those in desperate need.121
The High Court has also granted the structural interdict in cases where
there was insufficient information to determine the most appropriate relief
that would redress the violation. This relief is suitable in such circumstances
to enable the Court to adjust the order should new information emerge.122 In
a sense, some judges of the High Court consider the structural interdict to
be a deferential remedy, as it gives the state a chance to propose the most
effective means of realising the rights.123
In contrast, the Court has used this form of relief mainly in civil and
political rights cases where there is evidence of lackadaisical conduct from
the state,124 and where the information before the Court is inadequate for
the purposes of making a final order. The Court has also employed the
remedy where it lacks the expertise to make appropriate arrangements for
the eradication of the violation.125 The Court has, however, been reluctant
to use the structural interdict in socio-economic rights cases, as it is
constrained by the need to defer to the executive and to avoid protracted
litigation in such cases.126
An exception to this general trend appears in the recent case of Occupiers
of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Olivia
case).127 This case, in which the Community Law Centre (together with the
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions) participated as amicus curiae,
19
You are the “weakest link” in realising socio-economic rights: Goodbye
was brought to court by more than 400 occupiers of two bad buildings in
Johannesburg. They were resisting eviction, which was scheduled to take
place in pursuit of the City of Johannesburg’s regeneration programme.
The programme was intended to revamp the City by, among other things,
rehabilitating all bad (dilapidated) buildings. In the High Court, the
applicants argued that they could not be evicted without being provided
with alternative accommodation.128 The High Court found that the City’s
programme fell short of the requirement to provide suitable relief for people
in the City who were in a crisis or in desperate need of housing. In addition
to interdicting the eviction, it ordered the City to devise and implement,
within its available resources, a comprehensive and coordinated programme
to realise the right to adequate housing progressively for those in desperate
need of accommodation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) found that the buildings
were unsafe and authorised the eviction of the occupiers.129 It gave the
occupiers one month to move out or risk being evicted. However, it also
ordered the City to provide alternative temporary shelter to those in desperate
need of housing.
The occupiers appealed to the Court against the SCA’s decision. During
the case, the Court ordered the parties “to engage with each other
meaningfully ... in an effort to resolve the differences and difficulties aired
in this application”. They were also ordered to file affidavits on a stipulated
date reporting on the results of the engagement between them.130 This order
is what could be described as “an interim structural order”. The order was
justified by the need to have the dispute resolved amicably and by the fact
that, as a public institution, the City had an obligation to engage vulnerable
people before making decisions that adversely affected them.131
The order provided interim protection for the applicants against eviction.
The negotiations resulted in an agreement on interim measures the City
would take to make the buildings safer and more habitable. By promoting
dialogue, the Court created a favourable environment for ensuring
enforcement of its final order with minimal judicial involvement. Recent
evidence shows that the negotiations have yielded positive results for the
applicants. In a press statement, CALS, the legal aid clinic which represented
the applicants, has indicated satisfaction with the implementation of the
order arising from the settlement. The 450 residents have voluntarily been
moved by the City to better housing.132 Here the residents have water,
electricity, sanitation and shared cooking and ablution facilities.133 The
conclusion of this case could be described as a great success for advocates of
housing rights in South Africa. This is because:
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What was labelled ‘impossible’ by the city just a few short years ago
has now been achieved, largely through active and (mostly) positive
engagement with the poor communities. Ironically, it was the diffi-
culty the city had with the idea of engaging with poor people that
formed much of the basis for its reluctance to implement an inner-city
housing programme in the first place.134
The interim order made by the Court was also implemented before the
relocation was effected at San José and 197 Main Street. The City had restored
the water supply, provided portable toilets, refuse removal services and fire
extinguishers in accordance with the terms of the interim order. The City
also took charge of the relocation, providing trucks, movers and security.
5 GOVERNMENT: A RELUCTANCE TO IMPLEMENT COURT
ORDERS?
The conclusion of the Olivia case could lead one to the conclusion that the
state is compliant after all. However, such a conclusion would be based on
one isolated case. A proper conclusion should assess the success that has
been achieved in cases other than Olivia. The starting point could be the
successes scored in implementing the judgment in the Grootboom case. In
August 2008, it was reported in the press that Mrs Irene Grootboom had
died in her shack despite the fact that she had successfully litigated for the
right to decent housing.135 The question is whether the Grootboom judgment
has been implemented. Two studies have been undertaken to assess the
housing situation of the Wallacedene community after the Grootboom
judgment. The first study was done by Karrisha Pillay, two years after the
judgment.136 The other study is as recent as 2008 – an evaluation of public
interest litigation done by Gilbert Marcus and Steven Budlender.137
According to Pillay, the Grootboom judgment failed to live up to the
expectations of both the litigants and those who were hoping for a dramatic
change in government policy on housing. In her opinion, a key contributing
factor to the lack of implementation of the judgment was the nature of the
orders handed down by the Court.138 The first order arose from the settlement
of the parties, while the second order was a general declaratory order made
at the end of the case. The fact that this case produced two orders contributed
to the confusion as to what needed to be done to comply with the judgment.139
The South African Human Rights Commission, for example, was not sure
about which order it was mandated to monitor.140
The formulation of the order raised more problems. Pillay has submitted:
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This general order is weaker than the order handed down by the High
Court because it is merely a declaratory order and does not compel the
State to take steps to ensure that its programme complies with the
Constitutional requirements. A further problem with the Constitu-
tional Court order, which also stems from the declaratory nature of
the order, is that the order does not contain any time frames within
which the State has to act. The result is that, more than a year after the
Grootboom judgment was handed down, there has been little tangible
or visible change in housing policy so as to cater for people who find
themselves in desperate and crisis situations.141
Because of the unclear formulation of what was expected from the
government, “there ... [was] a clear lack of understanding that the judgement
... [required] systemic changes to national, provincial and local housing
programmes to cater for people in desperate and crisis situations”.142 The
Court’s refusal to play any role in supervising implementation of these orders
only served to compound the problem.143
One cannot assess the extent to which the order itself is to blame for its
non-implementation without understanding the theoretical and practical
considerations that influenced its grant. One could not reasonably have
expected the Court to make a mandatory order in the first major social
justice case to be decided against the state. It was too soon for it to determine
whether the state would abide by its directions. Furthermore, as the case
between the parties had been settled, judgment was only to determine the
overall effect of the housing policy.144
There is no doubt that the situation of the Wallacedene community has
not changed much since Grootboom was decided. This community is still
exposed to severe flooding every winter and still lacks the basic facilities the
state undertook to provide.145 In 2004, press reports indicated that all that
the Wallacedene community had to show for their victory was a smelly
ablution block built in a donga that had served as a latrine. The shelter and
sanitations services were found to be in a sorry state.146 Marcus and
Budlender discuss the question of whether the situation of the Wallacedene
community has resulted from the non-compliance of the court order in the
case. What one can deduce from their discussion is that despite the initial
problems encountered in implementing the interlocutory order, the order
was later implemented fully:
Though government had taken months to comply with the terms of the offer
and urgent order and though there was some disagreement about whether
every aspect of the order had been complied with, it is clear that generally
the terms of the offer and order were fulfilled by the government.147
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Marcus and Budlender have revealed what is at the heart of the
disillusionment of the Wallacedene community. To them, “[t]he community’s
disillusionment seems to stem mainly from its perception that the court
victory meant that they would ultimately be getting actual housing, rather
than some temporary form of shelter”.148 In this respect, Marcus and
Budlender believe that there is nothing in the Court’s judgment that
suggested that formal housing for the community was on the immediate
horizon:149 “the expectations seem to have resulted at least partly from a
lack of clear communication between the lawyer and his clients about the
likely and actual outcome of the case.”150
From the above, it is clear that the success of the Grootboom judgment
cannot be determined by reference to the Wallacedene community alone
because the final judgment was not only directed at them but at all homeless
South Africans. The remaining question, therefore, is whether the judgment
has had any significant effect on the housing policy and the overall delivery
of adequate housing to those in need. The following section addresses this
question.
5.1 Effect on housing policy and actual access to housing
A recent report by the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, Miloon
Kothari, details the deficiencies in the housing policy and access to adequate
housing.151 The report provides evidence of failure to respond to the housing
needs of the poor, failure to implement housing laws and policies coherently
and to halt forced evictions.152 The factors the Special Rapporteur identifies
as being responsible for this state of affairs include the lack of cooperative
governance in housing development; the insufficient information-sharing
between levels of administration; the lack of integrated housing development
which considers social services within housing projects; and poor quality
construction.153 This is in addition to there being no mechanisms for the
implementation of the “well-intentioned policies” made at the national level.154
However, there have been some positive changes in housing policy and
case law, although these are limited:155
[T]he decision has had two distinct positive impacts as regards hous-
ing rights. First, it has created a powerful tool for the advocates of
specific communities involved in eviction proceedings, building a grow-
ing body of right-to-housing case law. That tool has led to discrete
victories for local communities, even if the victory is simply the differ-
ence between being evicted and left homeless, or being allowed to re-
main in their, albeit informal, homes. Second, a recently adopted na-
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tional program for housing assistance in emergency circumstances is
a very promising document that if actually implemented could lead to
meaningful change in the lives of millions of South Africans.156
With regard to policy and access to housing, Budlender and others suggest
that the decision has forced the government to adjust its housing programme
to accommodate the needs of people in intolerable conditions and those
threatened with eviction.157 Evidence of effect of this is found in the National
Housing Programme: Housing Assistance in Emergency Circumstances
(Emergency Housing Programme)158 and the Informal Settlement Upgrading
Programme (Informal Settlements Programme).159 The Emergency Housing
Programme expressly acknowledges the influence of the Grootboom case
on its formulation.160 Its main objective is to provide temporary assistance
in the form of secure access to land and/or other basic municipal services
and shelter in a wide range of emergency situations. This is to be done,
among other things, through the allocation of grants to municipalities.161
The policy increases the possibility of people in desperate need obtaining
assistance.162
For its part, the Informal Settlements Programme allows municipalities
to apply for a community-based or area-based subsidy that is not linked to
individual households but based on the actual cost of improving an informal
settlement. It discourages municipalities from relocating informal
settlements from expensive or geo-technically unsuitable land to new housing
developments on the outskirts of cities and towns. Instead, it enables land
which is already occupied to be made habitable, even if it is regarded as
technically and economically unsuitable.163
The adoption of these programmes represents a partial implementation
of the Grootboom case. There are many concerns about the comprehensive-
ness of the programmes and their implementation. Wickeri, for example,
contends that there has not been a revolutionary change in either the
availability or delivery of housing for South Africa’s urban poor.164 Even at a
policy level, one cannot say with confidence that the current policies on
housing are comprehensive enough to cover all vulnerable people in need of
housing.165 There is, for instance, no coherent policy at the national level on
housing people with special housing needs such as women, especially abused
women, people living with HIV/AIDS, the aged, children, people with
disabilities and the poor.166
The Grootboom case has had a profound effect on subsequent cases dealing
with access to housing. These cases indicate that the Grootboom case has
not only altered South African law on housing and evictions but has also
laid the foundation for the development of the relevant legal principles.
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Nevertheless, a reading of these decisions also indicates that, had the
principles arising from the Grootboom judgment been observed, these cases
would not have arisen in the first place, the principles being that provision
should be made for those in desperate need. What this also means is that
“absence of an effective Grootboom-type programme of emergency relief might
preclude evictions”.167 An examination of a few cases will prove this point.
The cases that have come after the Grootboom judgment also emphasise
the constitutional obligation on the state to fully implement court orders.
One of the cases which is clear on this obligation is President of the Republic
of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others.168
This case arose from an eviction order given to a private landowner to evict
approximately 18 000 people settled on private land. The sheriff had insisted
on a deposit of R1,8 million to cover the estimated costs of a security firm
which she intended to hire to assist her in evicting the occupiers and
demolishing their shacks. This amount by far exceeded the value of the
part of the property which was occupied. The landowner was unwilling and
unable to spend so much on executing the judgment and lodged an application
against the state to force the sheriff to carry out the eviction order. The
application argued that the failure on the part of the state to carry out the
eviction order undermined the right to property as guaranteed by s 25 of the
Constitution.
The occupants, who had by this time swelled to 40 000, also resisted the
eviction and argued that they could not be evicted from Modderklip’s property
without provision of alternative accommodation. It was contended on their
behalf that this would undermine their right of access to adequate housing
as guaranteed by s 26(1) of the Constitution. The Court emphasised the
constitutional obligation on the state to ensure execution of court orders
arising from the principles of the rule of law. According to the Court, court
orders must be enforced in a manner that prevents social upheaval.169 The
complexity of this case, however, arises from the fact that an eviction would
have resulted in people being rendered homeless. To prevent this upheaval,
the Court held that the state had an obligation to provide alternative
accommodation in line with its constitutional duty to ensure access to
adequate housing.170 The Court ordered compensation for Modderklip for
the use of the land. The Court also indicated that the option to expropriate
the land to accommodate the applicants was open to the state.171
The aspect of the case most relevant to this paper is the extent of
implementation of the court order requiring the occupants to be provided
with alternative accommodation. In 2005, the Community Law Centre did
research to establish this.172 At the conclusion of the case, expropriation of
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the Modderklip farm appeared to be the only reasonable option because of
the problems that would be encountered in relocating over 40 000 residents.
The state, however, chose to relocate the people. This was based on findings
that the site was geo-technically unsuitable because of previous mining on
the land. The state indicated that the relocation was their top priority and
would be effected as soon as the necessary legal and planning processes,
including the provision of basic municipal services, had been completed.173
The preparation for the relocation by ensuring proper planning and the
provision of basic services conformed to the content of the right of access to
adequate housing which requires services in addition to shelter.174
Despite the above, the actual implementation of the order faced a number
of obstacles. Foremost of these was the lack of transparency on the part of
the authorities: vital information on the relocation, such as the time of
relocation and the location of the alternative land, had been withheld from
the occupants.175 The importance of information in effecting court orders
cannot be overemphasised. Information and transparency are vital for
effective monitoring of the extent to which the order has been implemented.176
It should also be noted that, despite the indication that relocation was top
priority, there has been an inordinate delay in effecting this.
Among the cases which would not have arisen had the Grootboom
principles been observed is the Port Elizabeth case. This case was brought
under the Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act,177 but its facts and issues are similar in many respects to those in
the Grootboom case. In this case, over 60 people and 23 children had occupied
private land, some of them after being evicted from their previous residences.
The Rudolph case is similar. It emanated from an eviction application made
by the City of Cape Town. Just like the Grootboom community, the Rudolph
community (in Valhalla Park) had moved on to vacant land owned by the
City to escape from the intolerable conditions in which they lived. The
community filed a counter-application in which they argued that they could
not be evicted unless the City provided emergency shelter in terms of the
Grootboom judgment. The City lost its application but the counter-application
was successful, resulting in an order that the City make provision for the
short-term housing needs of the Rudolph community.
The Olivia case is another example. The Court declined to adjudicate on
the constitutionality of the housing plan proposed by the City to address the
plight of all people in need of housing.178 It is clear from this case that it
should not have arisen had the City complied with the principles in the
Grootboom case by making provision for those in desperate need, thus
effectively implementing the Emergency Housing Programme.
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5.2 Effect of Grootboom on other socio-economic rights
The Grootboom case has had a major effect on the development of other
socio-economic rights because the decision has changed the government’s
attitude towards these rights. This has arisen from the awareness that
failure to act reasonably will attract judicial sanction. These developments
are feasible in policy formulation processes relevant to a number of socio-
economic rights, some of which have been the subject of adjudication applying
the principles in the Grootboom judgment. For the purpose of this paper,
only the rights of access to health care services and to social security and
assistance are discussed.
5.2.1 Effect on the right of access to health care services
The effect of the Grootboom case on the right of access to health care services
can be assessed by first examining the TAC case. This case was instituted
by a number of organisations led by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),
with the amicus support of the Community Law Centre. The applicants
challenged a government programme on the prevention of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV/AIDS. The basis of the challenge was that the
programme restricted the provision of nevirapine (medication for the
prevention of mother-to-child transmission) to specific hospitals designated
as research sites. Consequently, a large number of pregnant mothers and
their children could not access the medication. Although the medication
had been certified by the Medicines Control Council, the government argued
that the restriction was necessary to ascertain the efficacy of the medication.
The main question in the case was whether the programme was
reasonable.179 The Court held that it was not. This is because not all mothers
and their newborn babies could access the designated pilot sites.180 It also
found that the programme excluded the most vulnerable – “those who cannot
afford to pay for medical services”.181 It also underscored the vulnerability of
children at the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS:
Their needs are ‘most urgent’ and their ability to have access to
nevirapine profoundly affects their ability to enjoy all rights to which
they are entitled. Their rights are ‘most in peril’ as a result of the policy
that has been adopted and are most affected by a rigid and inflexible
policy that excludes them from having access to nevirapine.182
What is of concern, however, is the extent to which the judgment has been
implemented and the extent to which it has (as it should have) influenced
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changes in the general response to the problem of HIV/AIDS. The TAC has
consistently criticised the government for its failure to distribute
antiretroviral medication effectively. Like the Grootboom case, the TAC
case demonstrates the reluctance of the government to overhaul the health
system to extend HIV/AIDS treatment to everyone.
The most recent case illustrating this failure is EN and Others v
Government of RSA and Others (Westville case).183 This case was commenced
by the AIDS Law Project (ALP), the TAC and 15 HIV-positive prisoners
from the Westville Correctional facility in KwaZulu-Natal to compel the
government to remove all obstacles preventing the 15 prisoners and other
prisoners in a similar condition from accessing antiretroviral treatment.
They also sought an order for the government to provide the 15 prisoners
and other similarly situated prisoners with antiretroviral treatment in
accordance with the existing government Operational Plan for
Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment
(Operational Plan),184 which they argued had not been implemented with
reasonable speed and urgency.
The Court found that the implementation of the Operational Plan was
unreasonable and inflexible with regard to the needs of prisoners. It granted
the orders sought by the applicants. The recalcitrance of the state is reflected
in its failure to comply with a consent agreement between the parties, and
choosing instead to engage in adversarial litigation. As a result, the judge
issued a structural interdict requiring the respondents to file a plan within
two weeks on how they intended to implement the court order.185
The most interesting aspect of the Westville case, however, is that even
after judgment was handed down, the government was not willing to abide
by the directions of the Court. The attitude of the government in this case is
proof of lack of respect for the rule of law.186 Rather than implement the
court order, the government chose to appeal on a technicality: the judge had
erred in refusing to step down despite the fact that one of the counsel for the
applicants was his daughter. The government also applied to stop the
implementation of the orders of the High Court pending the appeal. At the
conclusion of this application,187 Nicholson J found that the prisoners would
suffer irreparable harm if the interim order was set aside. This harm was
far greater than the inconvenience likely to be suffered by the state.188
Nicholson did not spare the government:
If the government of the Republic of South Africa has given such an
instruction [to disobey the Court order] then we face a grave constitu-
tional crisis involving a threat to the doctrine of separation of powers.
Should that continue the members of the judiciary will have to con-
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sider whether their oath of office requires them to continue on the
bench.189
Although finally the government did file a plan, a lot of damage had already
been done. The reputations of the Department of Correctional Services and
the Minister of Health were damaged and the case almost led to the
breakdown in the relationship between the executive and the judiciary.
Despite some shortcomings dictated in the department’s Operational Plan,
it was acknowledged that the plan was evidence that the it had begun, in a
more systematic way, to address the issue of HIV/AIDS – including providing
access to antiretroviral treatment.190 Recent reports indicate that the
department is taking the issue of providing antiretroviral treatment to
prisoners seriously. The reports indicate that access to antiretroviral
treatment by prisoners has increased and was projected to increase by 76%
by the end of 2008.191
5.2.2 Social assistance cases: despondence in the Eastern Cape
The Eastern Cape provincial government has been foremost in disobeying
court orders in cases concerning the right to social security and assistance.192
In explaining the problem of non-compliance, the Court observed in
Vumazonke and Others v MEC Department of Social Development, East
Cape that:
notwithstanding that literally thousands of orders have been made
against the respondent’s department over the past number of years, it
appears to be willing to pay the costs of those applications rather than
remedy the problem of maladministration and inefficiency that has
been identified as the root cause of the problem. ... the courts are left
with a problem they cannot resolve: while they grant relief to individu-
als who approach them for relief, they are forced to watch impotently
while dysfunctional and apparently unrepentant administration con-
tinues to abuse its power at the expense of large numbers of poor peo-
ple, the very people ‘who are most lacking in protective and assertive
armour’ and whose needs ‘must animate our understanding of the
Constitution’s provisions’. What escalates what I have termed a prob-
lem into a crisis, is that the cases that are brought to court represent the
tip of the ice-berg.193
One cannot, however, fully understand these cases without an appreciation
of the context within which they arose. Before the new constitutional
dispensation, South Africa had a fragmented, inequitable and
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administratively inefficient social security system that mainly covered those
in formal employment.194 During this period, social security and social
assistance were not protected as constitutional rights, since the Constitution
did not even have a Bill of Rights. In the new dispensation, the Constitution
guarantees the right to have access to social security, which includes
appropriate social assistance for those unable to support themselves and
their dependants.195 The promulgation of the Constitution, however, did not
immediately solve the administrative problems in the social security system.
Worst hit by maladministration was the Eastern Cape. The Court in the
Ngxuza case described the problems of administering the system in the
province. These included the fact that the information on record for many of
the beneficiaries was incomplete, there was duplication of payments and
the eligibility of many of the beneficiaries was suspect.196
In the Ngxuza case, the Eastern Cape provincial government requested
all beneficiaries to re-apply for their social grants as part of an attempt to
ascertain the number of deserving recipients of the grants and to eradicate
corruption. It also imposed a moratorium on new applications and on the
processing of arrears for beneficiaries. As a result, many people whose grants
had been terminated and whose applications had not been processed within
reasonable time resorted to litigation. In this case, the provincial government
was found to be in violation of the right to social security and assistance and
the right to just administrative action.197
In the Bushula case, the applicant, who had been receiving the disability
grant for over five years, was verbally informed of the termination of his
grant. The Court found that the termination violated the provisions of the
Social Assistance Act198 and its accompanying regulations, which authorised
the suspension of the grant after notification to the beneficiary but did not
confer the power of cancellation of a grant. In the end, the Court made the
following order:
(a) The decision ... cancelling the first applicant’s disability grant is
declared to be invalid and of no force and effect and is set aside;
(b) The first respondent is ordered to reinstate the first applicant’s
disability grant within a period of two weeks from the date of this
order, such reinstatement to be with effect from date of cancella-
tion thereof;
(c) It is declared that the first respondent is entitled to payment of all
arrears owing under his disability grant from the date of cancella-
tion therefore up to the present time.199
One would have expected the provincial government to apply the Bushula
case to all people in a similar predicament. Unfortunately, this is not what
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happened; the government did not reinstate the grants that were cancelled.
This precipitated further litigation; the most immediate was the Ngxuza
case referred to above. This case was followed by the Njongi case. The facts
leading to the termination of Njongi’s grant are similar to those in the two
cases cited above. However, Njongi had successfully re-applied for the
reinstatement of her grant. The trouble was that the application was
determined 18 months after its submission. The issue therefore was whether
she was entitled to arrears. The Court castigated the provincial government
for not reinstating the cancelled grants immediately after the Bushula case
was decided:
[B]earing in mind that there has been no appeal against the judgment
in Bushula ... the Provincial Government had accepted both that their
procedure had been wrong and that all grants improperly cancelled
ought to be fully reinstated in the sense ordered in Bushula. All af-
fected people ought to have been placed in the position in which they
would have been absent the unlawful administrative decision. Indeed,
the Provincial Government should have taken proactive measures to
fully reinstate every improperly cancelled social grant. This is a neces-
sary consequence of the duty of every organ of State to “assist and
protect courts to ensure that ... dignity ... and effectiveness of the courts.”
It would also be mandated by the constitutional injunction that an
order of court binds all organs of State to which it applies. The Provin-
cial Government had every right to appeal the order in Bushula. Once
it did not do so however, it had the duty in my view to ensure full
redress for every person in the position of Mr. Bushula. Nothing less
would have been acceptable.200
The Court confirmed the holding in the Bushula case that the termination
of the social grants was unlawful and unconstitutional, and ordered the
retrospective reinstatement of the applicant’s grant and payment of all the
arrears due with interest.201 It remains to be seen whether this decision will
eventually be respected.
6 YOU ARE THE “WEAKEST LINK”: GOODBYE!
6.1 Identifying the challenges
One cannot devise strategies to achieve full compliance with court orders
without identifying the challenges to be confronted. The challenges in this
regard can be deduced from the cases discussed above. Foremost of these is
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the reluctance on the part of state officials to observe the rule of law and
respect court orders. Evidence of this could be found in the reaction of the
mayor of Johannesburg, Amos Masondo, after judgment in the recent case
of Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (Mazibuko
case).202 In this case, the Court held that the installation of prepaid water
meters in the Phiri area (and by implication all municipalities in South
Africa) was ultra vires and unconstitutional. This is because it violated the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,203 the Water Services Act204 and
the constitutional right of access to sufficient water (s 27(1) of the
Constitution). The Court also found that the provision of 25 litres of water
per person per day was unreasonable and, on the basis of the minimum core
obligations approach, constitutionally inadequate. The Court ordered the
provision of 50 litres of water instead.
In reaction to this judgment, the mayor is quoted as saying:
Judges are not above the law. We don’t want judges to take the role of
Parliament, the role of the National Council of Provinces, the role of
the legislature and the role of this council. Judges must limit their
role.205
The mayor is also quoted as saying that if judges want to run the country
they should join political parties and contest elections.206 While one might
fault the judgment to the extent that it prescribes 50 litres of water on the
basis of the concept of the minimum core, the reaction of the mayor is
unbecoming and indicates a misconception of constitutional democracy.207
The mayor’s reaction clearly undermines the fundamental principle of the
rule of law.208 It should be noted that a respondent with such an attitude
would definitely ignore any orders arising from a judgment he or she considers
illegitimate. This attitude exacerbates inter-institutional mistrust between
the courts and the other organs of state and inevitably puts them on a
collision course, as can be clearly seen in the aftermath of the TAC and
Westville cases.
Another challenge noticed is the lack of transparency in the
implementation of court orders. As is seen from the Modderklip case, the
successful applicants and other stakeholders involved in the court process
are usually not informed about the steps that the state is taking to implement
the court orders. This makes both meaningful participation and the
monitoring of progress extremely difficult. There is apparently no rational
justification for this lack of transparency; the only reason offered is that
consultation would delay the process of implementation.209 However, the
lack of transparency and consultation delays the process, since it excludes a
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number of role-players who could contribute positively to the process of
implementation. Consultation of the civil society organisations involved in
the process might, for instance, assist in clarifying the full import of the
court order. This is one of the factors that contributed to the successful
implementation of the orders in the Olivia case.
The factors responsible for the slow delivery on housing, as identified by
the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, apply with equal force to
the implementation of court orders for housing as to other rights. The factors
the Special Rapporteur identifies include the lack of cooperative governance
and the insufficient information sharing between levels of administration.
These are fundamental flaws which greatly hamper compliance. It should
be noted that the semi-federal nature of governance in South Africa and the
sharing of components of socio-economic rights obligations between the
different spheres of government make cooperative governance inevitable. It
is for this reason that the Court in the Grootboom case held that a reasonable
programme to deliver socio-economic rights must be well coordinated
between the different levels of government. As seen from the discussion by
Pillay, lack of cooperation between the different spheres of government is
identified as one of the factors responsible for the initial delays encountered
in enforcing the interlocutory orders in this case.
The non-implementation of court orders in the Eastern Cape in social
grant cases arises from maladministration combined with a lack of capacity
to carry out the required reforms, rather than obstinacy alone. These
deficiencies are not only responsible for the violation, but are also to blame
for the failure to remedy the violation – even after court action. It should be
noted that these problems are prevalent in sectors other than social assistance
and are not restricted to the Eastern Cape but are found in other provinces
too. Similar challenges exist in the housing sector where a lack of capacity,
especially at the provincial level, has made timely delivery of quality housing
difficult to achieve. The obstinacy and uncaring attitude exhibited at the
early stages of the Olivia case seem to have arisen partly from the failure to
understand the constitutional obligations imposed on the state. Had proper
skill been applied in the formulation of the regeneration strategy, the
upheavals it resulted in would not have occurred. During the initial stages
of the hearing of the case in the Court, for instance,210 some of the evidence
demonstrated confusion about which sphere of government (provincial versus
local) was responsible for budgeting and funding emergency housing.
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6.2 Way forward: strategies to overcome challenges
6.2.1 Exploiting invalidation of provisions of the State Liability Act
The recent judgment of the Court in the Nyathi case, invalidating s 3 of the
State Liability Act,211 has widened the possibilities of securing the compliance
of the state with court orders. The judgment has come after a long period of
obduracy by state institutions and officials. As observed by the Court in this
case, courts have had to spend too much time in trying to ensure that court
orders are enforceable against the state. This has arisen  from the fact that
a simple and straightforward procedure for enforcing judgments against
the state is not available.212 Before the judgment in the Nyathi case, the
state was protected by the State Liability Act from execution of court orders
against it, even when there was clear evidence of recalcitrance. Section 3
provided that:
No execution, attachment or like process shall be issued against the
defendant or respondent in any such action or proceedings or against
any property of the state, but the amount, if any, which may be re-
quired to satisfy any judgment or order given or made against the
nominal defendant or respondent in any action or proceedings may be
paid out of the National Revenue Fund or a Provincial Revenue Fund
as the case may be.
An example of a case where this section was applied is Jayiya v MEC for
Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another.213 In this case, the High Court found in
favour of the applicant and ordered the Permanent Secretary of Welfare,
cited as the second respondent, to make a lump sum payment to the applicant
within a period of 30 days. When default was registered, the applicant’s
attorneys commenced contempt of court proceedings and prayed for the
incarceration of the second respondent. The Supreme Court of Appeal found
that, by virtue of s 3 of the State Liability Act, the application for committal
was misconceived.214
In the Nyathi case, the applicant developed a medical condition from the
negligence of doctors at two public hospitals. Although the state admitted
liability, it failed to comply with an order to make interim payments to the
applicant pending the final determination of damages. To enforce this order,
the applicant sought a declaration that s 3 of the State Liability Act was
unconstitutional. In the Court, the state argued that it would be highly
prejudicial to the public interest to allow the attachment or sale of state
assets to execute (enforce) a judgment debt (compensation).215 The Court
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rejected this submission and held that the section infringed on the right to
equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law. It stated:
A judgment creditor who obtains judgment against a private litigant
is entitled to execute against a private litigant in order to obtain satis-
faction of the judgment debt. However, a judgment creditor who ob-
tains judgment against the state is expressly prohibited from execut-
ing against state property in order to obtain satisfaction of the judg-
ment debt. The effect of this is that section 3 disallows a judgment
creditor who obtains judgment against the state the same protection
and benefit that a judgment creditor who obtains judgment against a
private litigant enjoys.216
The Court viewed s 3 as effectively placing the state above the law, as it did
not positively oblige the state to comply with court orders as required by the
Constitution.217 The Court also found that the section infringed upon the
right to dignity because it compelled the applicant to wait for an extremely
long time before the money required for his treatment could be paid.218
The Nyathi judgment will have a major effect on state compliance with
court orders. The state, conscious of the fact that it is no different from
private litigants, will take court orders seriously. The effect of this will be
felt mostly with respect to monetary judgments. The judgment is, however,
of limited application to other forms of orders. In particular, the Court
discouraged contempt of court orders as tedious and onerous for a successful
litigant who has already spent a great amount of time and money.219 The
Court also denounced the approach of holding officials responsible for the
wrongs they have committed in their official capacity, as this would result
only in “naming and shaming” and would not produce a real remedy for the
victim.220 However, it is argued that the reasons the Court gives for
discouraging contempt of court proceedings are not particularly convincing.
Execution by attachment and sale can be as tedious as contempt of court
proceedings – a warrant has to be sought, a court sheriff and auctioneers
appointed, and payments made for these processes.
6.2.2 Inculcating a culture of constitutionalism and promoting the rule
of law
While the invalidation of s 3 of the State Liability Act should be lauded, it
should be emphasised that, ultimately, the successful implementation of
court orders is largely dependent on the political will of the state. The state
could still undermine the court by excepting through legislation, as the
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Court conceded,221 certain kinds of property from attachment. What needs
to be done is to inculcate and entrench a culture of constitutionalism and
respect for the rule of law, something which, as seen from the remarks of
such officials as the mayor of Johannesburg after judgment in the Mazibuko
case, has eluded some state officials. In light of this, it is necessary for state
officials to learn that judicial and state processes are not adverse to one
another, but are complementary. Instead of viewing the courts’ role in
enforcing rights as an unwelcome intrusion, officials should understand
that this is part of the “constitutional conversation” between courts and the
government on how best to realise human rights. In this regard, rather
than detracting from democratic politics, the judicial enforcement of human
rights enriches constitutional democracy.222
6.2.3 Promoting inter-institutional dialogue and amicable settlements
In addition to the above it is important to cultivate inter-institutional trust
between the courts, the government and civil society. This can be achieved
by promoting alternative dispute resolution and amicable settlements, not
only as an alternative to court action, but also as part of the court processes.
There is no doubt that the state is more likely to carry out orders realised
through amicable settlements. Indeed, it is especially at the level of remedies
that the greatest potential lies for forging relations between institutions to
bring about relief that is both effective and legitimate.223 This is a course
that the Court has already embarked on, as seen in the Olivia and Port
Elizabeth cases; in the latter the Court observed that this approach might
not only “reduce the expenses of litigation … [but also] avoid the exacerbation
of tensions that forensic combat produces”.224
Promoting institutional dialogue and amicable settlements, as was done
in the Olivia case, also has the advantage of obtaining meaningful
enforcement of the court order while minimising court involvement.225 This
is because engaging the government in the interpretative process of the
rights and respecting its interpretations where appropriate will produce
acceptable remedies. This approach can prove far more effective when
compared to the seemingly antagonistic process by which the government
waits for specific court instruction.226 The approach also gives the executive
freedom to decide how to fulfil its constitutional obligations. In the process,
courts are in a position to understand the government’s perspectives of its
own constitutional obligations.227 It is important that civil society also
cooperates in this process to ensure that a good working relationship between
courts and the government develops.228
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6.2.4 Combining litigation with other strategies
It should be noted that litigation per se, even when successful for the litigants,
might not lead to socio-economic transformation as rapidly as might be
expected. As a matter of fact, it is fruitless and even dangerous to look to the
courts for the first and last word on any matter concerning the vindication
of fundamental rights. This is because real gains in the area of social justice
often spring from years of grassroots organising by individuals and social
movements. South Africa has a rich history of grassroots struggles and
social movements including political organisations, trade unions, civic
organisations, religious organisations and NGOs.229
A new generation of social movements has now emerged.230 They include
the TAC, Concerned Citizens Forum, Anti-Eviction Campaign, Anti
Privatisation Forum, Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, Landless Peoples
Movement, Basic Income Grant Coalition, and the Education Rights
Project.231 While these organisations have used litigation to challenge certain
socio-economic policies, by reminding the government of its socio-economic
rights obligations, they have shown that they realise the limitations of
litigation. Consequently, some of them have successfully combined litigation
with social mobilisation through protests, demonstrations and public
campaigns. They have also used the Constitution and the language of rights
to legitimise their social mobilisation activities.232 In the process, they have
not only contributed to the development of the law, but have also contributed
to the abolition of oppressive laws by, for instance, advocating civil
disobedience.233
The South African experience has shown that litigation and social
mobilisation feed into each other. Social mobilisation before litigation has
not only been used to force the government into submission, thus rendering
litigation unnecessary, but has also been used to illustrate the problems
and extent of the violations for which litigation has been instituted. This
“means that a court deciding a conflict does so in the knowledge of the
expectations and lives that depend on the outcome”.234 The experience of the
TAC vividly demonstrates that using court action can catalyse political and
community mobilisation and create a space where poor people can contest
the policies and practices of both public and private entities.235
There is a need to increase the use of social mobilisation, after successful
litigation, to call for the implementation of court orders. Such social
mobilisation has the potential to promote the implementation of court orders
in the same way that it has promoted substantive litigation on socio-economic
rights. Indeed, it has been argued that full implementation of the Grootboom
case will depend largely on the continued ability of civil society “to mobilize
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political support while simultaneously putting pressure on government at
all levels through litigation”.236
6.2.5 Heightening the monitoring of implementation
There is a need to heighten monitoring of implementation of court orders by
civil society and other actors. It has been argued that delays in enforcing
court orders can be minimised by having bodies such as the South African
Human Rights Commission monitor the process. These institutions could
investigate and highlight any delays and bring them to the attention of the
appropriate structures.237 Monitoring and supervision, if done in a coordinated
and amicable manner, can also help to overcome some of the administrative
hurdles likely to be encountered in the implementation of orders. There is
often a lack of follow-up on the implementation of court orders following
successful court action. It appears that when public interest litigators get
positive judgment in one case, they move on to other areas, which explains
some of the difficulties encountered in trying to get information on whether
orders have been implemented. There is definitely a need to monitor the
case until final implementation, as has been done by CALS in the Olivia
case with regard to the interlocutory order.
It also appears that frequent use of the structural interdict has now
become inevitable in South Africa, given the state’s record of non-compliance.
As argued earlier, this form of relief should be a last resort and only introduced
in a graduated manner. It compels the government to reform its policy and
become more responsive to the needs of the poor. The Olivia case has shown
how structural relief combined with amicable settlement can be effective in
implementing court orders.
6.2.6 Promoting intergovernmental cooperation and consultation
It is necessary to promote consultation and intergovernmental cooperation
in the implementation of orders. This makes it imperative for all the spheres
of government to understand the nature of the obligations imposed on each
of them by the court order. Such cooperation will lead to coordination in
implementing orders and will minimise delays. All spheres of government
need to be made respondents to the court action. This lays very good ground
for cooperation after judgment. For instance, the confusion caused in the
Olivia case regarding funding of emergency housing between the local and
provincial government could have been avoided if the provincial government




The judiciary is undoubtedly central to the South African goal of achieving
transformation through the realisation of the socio-economic rights in the
Constitution. However, the role of litigation as a tool of realising these rights
has been seriously undermined by government indifference and, at times,
open defiance of court orders relating to socio-economic rights, thus depriving
litigants of the fruits of successful litigation.
This paper has illustrated the magnitude of the problem and the factors
underlying it. While the court orders might in some cases be faulted, the
greater concern has been the state’s non-compliance with them. Many factors
could be cited for such non-compliance. These include capacity or resource
constraints. However, there is also clear evidence of the state’s reluctance
to obey the directions of the courts. For instance, despite several court orders,
the state has not taken any visible steps to address the capacity and
administrative problems in the social and welfare development sector of the
Eastern Cape. Likewise, the state has failed to provide for the housing needs
of those in emergency situations, as was held in the Grootboom case.
The paper has proposed a number of strategies to address the problem of
non-compliance with court orders. First, courts should encourage negotiated
settlements of disputes in socio-economic rights cases, as this will improve
the chances of implementation of court orders arising from such settlements.
The Olivia case has opened the way for this strategy. The decision in the
Nyathi case, which invalidated s 3 of the State Liability Act, has also widened
the opportunities for enforcing court orders involving liquidated damages.
This case exposes the state to the same consequences of litigation as those
that private litigants face with regard to money orders.
To cover the gaps that are still left, the paper has emphasised the need
to inculcate a culture of rule of law and the appreciation of the role of the
judiciary within the context of the separation of powers. Moreover, civil
society and other stakeholders should combine litigation with other strategies
of realising socio-economic rights. Based on the experiences of such
organisations as the TAC, social mobilisation is a formidable tool for bringing
about social change and holding the state accountable.
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